Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal
Volume 22 Issue 1 Article 2
5-15-2022
"Stronger" Together: Kanye Could Have Owned His Masters by "Stronger" Together: Kanye Could Have Owned His Masters by
Engaging in Collective Bargaining Engaging in Collective Bargaining
L. Camille Cordova
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Recommended Citation Recommended Citation
L. Camille Cordova,
"Stronger" Together: Kanye Could Have Owned His Masters by Engaging in Collective
Bargaining
, 22 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 39 (2022)
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“Stronger” Together: Kanye Could
Have Owned His Masters by
Engaging in Collective Bargaining
L. Camille Cordova
I. Introduction
“The music industry and the NBA are modern day
slave ships.”
1
After this bold preface, Kanye West published
his contract with Roc-A-Fella Records, a division of
Universal Music Group (“Universal”), page by page on
Twitter (in 114 tweets, no less) for “every lawyer in the
world to look at.
2
West’s Twitter rant was sparked by
his frustration over litigation against Universal for the
ownership of his master recordings—the original, official
and final recording of West’s songs from which all copies
are later produced.
3
Recording artists with equal notoriety to West have
publicly challenged their record labels for the ownership
rights to their master recordings for decades.
4
In the ‘90s,
Prince painted “Slave” on his cheek to protest Warner Music
refusing to sell him his master recordings.
5
Almost thirty
1
Kanye West (@kanyewest), TWITTER (Sept. 14, 2020, 7:53 P.M.),
https://twitter.com/kanyewest/status/1305671043097468928.
2
Shawn Setaro, What We Learned From Reading Over 100 Pages of Kanye
West’s Record Contracts, COMPLEX.COM (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.complex.com/music/2020/09/kanye-west-record-contracts-what-
we-learned; Kanye West (@kanyewest), TWITTER (Sept. 16, 2020, 11:33A.M.),
https://twitter.com/kanyewest/status/1306270045354356737.
3
Murray Stassen, Kanye West: I Will Buy Universal Music Group For $33BN,
MUSIC BUSINESS WORLDWIDE (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/kanye-west-i-will-buy-universal-
music-group-for-33bn/; Elizabeth Vulaj, Singing a different tune: Taylor Swift
& Other Artists' Fight for Music Ownership, 2020 PRINDBFR 0225 (2020).
4
Vulaj, supra note 3.
5
Lisa Kay Davis, Prince Fought Big Labels for Ownership, Artistic Control,
NBC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2016, 9:04 P.M.),
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years later, pop and country artist Taylor Swift took to
Tumblr and Instagram to vent her frustrations with Scooter
Braun of Big Machine Label Group and Scott Borchetta of
Big Machine Records for refusing to consider selling her
master recording copyrights to her.
6
Recording artists should own the master recording
rights to the music they create, but record labels are
disincentivized to give them up because a large amount of
income earned from the music is earned from licensing the
copyrights to them.
7
Moreover, it reasonable to give the
record labels an ownership interest in the master recording
rights because they undertake an enormous financial risk
when they sign new recording artists.
8
However, record
labels should not own them indefinitely. The proper balance
between the recording artists’ and record labels’ interests is
to initially grant the recording artist the proper ownership of
their master recording copyrights but require them to
immediately license or assign such rights to the record label,
after which the rights would revert to the recording artist.
9
However, most recording artists do not possess the
bargaining power to negotiate such terms into their initial
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/prince-fought-big-labels-ownership-
artistic-control-n560161/.
6
Vulaj, supra note 3.
7
Id. Ben Sisario and Joe Coscarelli, Taylor Swift’s Feud With Scooter Braun
Spotlights Musicians’ Struggles to Own Their Work, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/arts/music/taylor-swift-master-
recordings.html. The copyright owner also controls how the music is
exploited—the owner decides how, where, and by whom the music can be
performed, and which mediums the music will be released through for sale and
whether the music can be licensed for use in movies and video games. Id. Vulaj,
supra note 3.
8
How Much Money Do Record Labels Spend on Marketing, INTL CTR. FOR
SETTLEMENT INV. DISPS (Nov. 5, 2021) [hereinafter ICSID],
https://www.icsid.org/uncategorized/how-much-money-do-record-labels-
spend-on-marketing/. The International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry (IFPI) published a study in 2020 that found record labels spend
approximately $500,000 to $2,000,000 to break into the music industry. Id.
9
This mirrors the requirements and protections provided to other kinds of artists
(e.g., authors) protected by 17 U.S.C. § 203.
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contract. While the contract defense of unconscionability is
theoretically available to recording artists, no court has ever
found a standardized contract for recording artists
unconscionable,
10
and only a handful of recording artists
have been able to negotiate their master recording rights
back from the label after signing a contract that does not
provide for reversion of them.
11
Congress has similarly
failed to protect recording artists. Section 203 of the 1976
Copyright Act allows artists who created copyrighted
“works for hire” to terminate any previous transfers of the
copyright interest after a period of thirty-five years.
12
However, recording artists are considered employees of the
record label under the statute and do not possess these same
termination rights.
13
Because the legislature and judiciary have failed to
protect recording artists’ interests, this article proposes that
engaging in collective bargaining will re-balance the
bargaining positions of the major record labels and recording
artists to create a mutually beneficial agreement that gives
recording artists a termination of rights clause (“termination
clause”) that mirrors section 203 of the 1976 Copyright Act.
By contracting with a major record label, recording artists
are automatically eligible for union membership to the
Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and
Radio Artists union (“SAG-AFTRA”), who have experience
negotiating other collective-bargaining agreements with
these record labels.
14
This agreement would provide
10
Omar Anorga, Music Contracts Have Musicians Playing in the Key of
Unconscionability, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 739, 740 (2003).
11
Tuneen E. Chisolm, Whose Song Is That? Searching for Equity and
Inspiration for Music Vocalists Under the Copyright Act, 19 YALE J. L. & TECH.
274, 312 (2017).
12
17 U.S.C. § 203(a).
13
17 U.S.C. § 201.
14
Elias Leight, There’s a Musicians Union. Many Musicians Are Unaware—or
Unable to Join, ROLLINGSTONE (May 6, 2019, 1:52 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/theres-a-musicians-union-
many-musicians-are-unaware-or-unable-to-join-831574/. The SAG-AFTRA
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industry wide benefits that are not necessarily limited to
termination rights.
15
Part II of this article assesses the disparity of
bargaining positions between the record label and the
recording artist. Part III explains why collective bargaining
is the best way for recording artists to gain ownership of their
master recording rights. Finally, Part IV concludes the
article by discussing the benefits of collective bargaining for
both parties.
II. Background
To understand how collective bargaining can help
recording artists regain ownership of their music, it is first
important to understand the record label-recording artist
relationship and the current state of relevant copyright and
contract law.
A. The “Major Record Label Is In A
Superior Bargaining Position
Relative to the Recording Artist
In 2019, the recorded music industry generated
$11.1 billion in revenue in the United States.
16
The recorded
and the American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada
(“AFM”) are the two largest unions in the United States. Texas Music Office,
The Unions Getting Started in the Music Business, STATE OF TEXAS (last
visited Nov. 12, 2020), https://gov.texas.gov/music/page/tmlp_unions.
15
Though the focus of this article is on termination rights, a collective-
bargaining agreement could also address a myriad of other issues recording
artists face such as ownership of their publication rights, streaming royalties,
duration of contracts, etc.
16
Dan Rys, US Recorded Music Revenue Reaches $11.1 Billion in 2019, 79%
From Streaming: RIAA, BILLBOARD.COM (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8551881/riaa-music-industry-
2019-revenue-streaming-vinyl-digital-physical. This figure is based on the
Recording Industry Association of America’s (“RIAA”) annual year-end report.
Id. The report takes only revenue generated from streaming (paid subscriptions,
ad-supported on-demand audio/video, and digital and customized radio
services), physical products, digital downloads, and synch listening. JOSHUA P.
FRIEDLANDER, YEAR-END 2019 RIAA MUSIC REVENUES REPORT 1 (Recording
Industry Association of America ed., 2020), https://www.riaa.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/02/RIAA-2019-Year-End-Music-Industry-Revenue-
Report.pdf. This figure does not take other forms of music revenue into account
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music market is currently controlled by only three major”
record label companies: Sony Music Entertainment,
Universal Music Group, and Warner Music Group.
17
Larry
Miller, director of New York University’s music business
program, likened these three record labels to venture
capitalists.
18
These record labels pay for all of the initial
costs associated with creating recordings and their
subsequent marketing and distribution.
19
In 2020, the IFPI
estimated that major record labels invest up to $2 million in
each new performance act they signed.
20
As former head of
the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”)
explains, the record labels “take huge financial risks that
help advance artists’ careers—risks that few artists are
willing to take on their own.”
21
Accordingly, the record
label owns the master recordings rights in exchange for
making an investment in unproven talent.
22
Artists who want record label representation but
want to forego major labels can opt to sign with an
independent (“indie”) record label.
23
However, indie labels
do not generally have the same investment capital or
such as revenue made from publishing, performances, merchandise, etc. Id. Of
the $11.1 billion dollars, 79.5% was generated form streaming revenue which
includes paid subscriptions (Spotify Premium, Tidal), ad-supported on-demand
audio and video (Vevo, YouTube, and ad-supported Spotify), and digital and
customized radio services (SiriusXM and Pandora). Id.
17
Chisolm, supra note 11, at 305. Independent record labels that are not
affiliated with the “major” record labels exist, but they are not the subject of
this article because the recording artist is in a better position to acquire their
master recording rights from a “minor” record label. See id. at 306.
18
Sisario and Cocarelli, supra note 7.
19
Steven Bolaños, "Knock, Knock, Knockin' on (Congress's) Door": A Plea to
Congress to Amend Section 203 of the Copyright Act of 1976, 41 W. ST. U. L.
REV. 391, 397 (2014).
20
ICSID, supra note 8.
21
Chuck Phillips, Record Label Chorus: High Risk, Low Margin, L.A. TIMES,
(May 31, 2001, 12:00 A.M.), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-
may-31-mn-4713-story.html.
22
Sisario and Cocarelli, supra note 7.
23
Chisolm, supra note 11, at 306.
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distribution and marketing power that major labels do.
24
Additionally, the rise of social media and technology slightly
lessened the power of major record labels because artists can
produce, promote, and digitally distribute their music more
efficiently than before.
25
However, without the distributing
and marketing saturation major record labels provide, indie
recording artists cannot achieve the same success as their
represented counterparts.
26
B. The Recording Artist Must Accept
Unfavorable Contract Terms or
Risk Not Being Represented
Regardless of their notoriety, few artist hopefuls
have the capital to create, market, and distribute their music
on their own.
27
The major record labels take advantage of
potential recording artists—especially those who are more
vulnerable due to their age who may be easily goaded into
signing contracts with one-sided terms—in exchange for the
chance of fame and fortune.
28
While each is different, most
recording contracts contain the following standard terms:
24
Id. at 306.
25
Anna S. Huffman, What the Music Modernization Act Missed, and Why
Taylor Swift Has the Answer: Payments in Streaming Companies' Stock Should
Be Dispersed Among All the Artists at the Label, 45 J. CORP. L. 537, 552 (2020).
“Thanks to a series of technological developments ranging from widespread use
of the internet, the development of web-based marketplaces, social media, and,
of course, digital music formats, signing with a major record label is no longer
the sole path to becoming as recording artist.” Chisolm, supra note 13, at 306.
26
Bolaños, supra note 19, at 397.
27
Chisolm, supra note 11, at 320.
28
Vulaj, supra note 3. Singer Jojo was twelve years old when she signed with
Background Entertainment in 2004. Id. In 2019, of the top twenty solo artists
of the Billboard 200 album chart, fifteen were under the age of thirty, and five
were under twenty-five. Tatiana Cirisano, Why Are Today’s Top-Charting
Music Stars So Young?, BILLBOARD (Sep. 12, 2019),
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8529105/young-top-charting-
music-stars-streaming-analysis/. Since 2000, the average age of Billboard 200
solo artists continues to trend downward. Id. Recording artists may also suffer
from mental health conditions that make them more vulnerable to predatory
agents and record label executives. See, e.g., Zack O’Malley Greenburg,
Kanye’s Second Coming: Inside the Billion-Dollar Yeezy Empire, FORBES (Aug.
31, 2019),
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1. Duration
The duration of a recording contract is typically
measured in albums, not years.
29
Though the terms may
vary, a typical recording contract requires the recording
artist to create music exclusively for the record label for the
duration of the term.
30
The record label has minimal
obligations regarding actually recording the artists’ music
while simultaneously reserving a number of unilateral
options of additional albums from the artist.
31
Put more
simply, the record label is usually only obligated to record
one album for an artist while at the same time reserving the
option to have the artist deliver five to six studio albums.
32
Additionally, satisfactory delivery of albums turns
on whether the artist is required to deliver “commercially
satisfactory recordings” or technically satisfactory
recordings.”
33
A commercially satisfactory recording is one
that the label believes will generate substantial income and
is standard for most new artists.
34
A technically satisfactory
recording just has to be well made (i.e., in tune with a steady
tempo and good technique, etc.).
35
A well-established artist
may be able to negotiate a technically satisfactory recording
term, but it is usually conditioned on being in the same style
as the artist’s previous work.
36
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2019/07/09/kanyes-
second-coming-inside-the-billion-dollar-yeezy-
empire/amp/?__twitter_impression=true (in an interview, Kanye West admitted
he suffered from bipolar disorder).
29
Chisolm, supra note 11, at 309.
30
Id, at 308.
31
Id.
32
Id.; Stella Brown, It Takes a Village to Make a Difference: Continuing the
Spirit of Copyright, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 129, 135 (2014). This
gives the record label time to determine whether the recording artist will be a
commercial success and gives them the option to drop the recording artist if
they are not determined to be profitable. Id. at 136.
33
Chisolm, supra note 11, at 308.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
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An album is usually ten to twelve songs.
37
Depending on how long it takes the artist to deliver a
“satisfactory” recording and how many options the record
label exercises, the artist could be bound by the exclusive
contract for seven years or more.
38
Unfortunately, “no
successful artist can deliver seven albums in seven years
[and ‘no one expects them to’], especially considering that
the record companies usually require an 18-month to two-
year gap between releases.”
39
This gap between record
releases allows the artist to tour and the record label to assess
the profitability of the album before deciding whether to
exercise another option.
40
California does not allow for personal service
contracts like those held by recording artists, actors, and
authors to be for a period of more than seven years.
41
However, there is a statutory exception for recording artists
that allows record labels to “recover damages for each
phonorecord” the artist fails to deliver.
42
While the
constitutionality of California’s law has been challenged,
ultimately all the lawsuits have settled out of court.
43
Statutory exceptions like these that exclude recording artists
from other kinds of creative professionals demonstrate the
lobbying power the major record labels possess and can lead
to contracts like Kanye West’s with EMI Music Publishing
that prohibited him from retiring.
44
2. Compensation
37
Id. at 308–09.
38
Id. at 309.
39
Id.
40
Id. Brown, supra note 32, at 136.
41
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(a) (West 2007).
42
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(b) (West 2007).
43
Chisolm, supra note 11, at 310.
44
Jem Aswad, Kanye West’s Publishing Contract Does Not Allow Him to Retire,
VARIETY (Mar. 4, 2019, 2:33 PM),
https://variety.com/2019/music/news/kanye-west-publishing-contract-does-
not-allow-him-to-retire-1203154689/.
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Recording artists do not directly earn income from
the licensing of their master recordings if they do not own
the copyrights.
45
In that instance, recording artists would
earn usage-based payments called royalties.
46
Typical
contracts allocate 13–16% of wholesale revenue of records
to new artists.
47
A new recording artist may renegotiate their
royalty rate if their album reaches a pre-determined number
of sales, but they still do not usually receive more than 14–
15% than the total wholesale sales.
48
Well-established
artists can typically negotiate up to a rate of 21% for royalty
payments.
49
Record labels will often give recording artists an
advance on the royalties the label anticipates from record
sales in order to provide the recording artist with cash flow
prior to the music release.
50
This advance is meant to cover
the expenses for recording the first album and the remainder
is spent at the recording artist’s discretion (i.e., living
expenses).
51
Most often these advances must be repaid to
the record label, meaning that artists can start out millions of
dollars in debt without having even made an album.
52
Since
the income recording artists earn from their contract with the
record label comes from royalties, the record label will often
withhold all or part of their royalty payments to the artist
until the advance is repaid in full.
53
Artists may go years
45
Chisolm, supra note 11, at 281.
46
Id. at 312. Royalty percentages are based on the wholesale album price (the
price the retail store purchases the album from the record label before the album
is sold to consumers). Id.
47
Id. at 313.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 312.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 312-13. For example, “if you receive a $10 advance and you have a
15% royalty, your music will have to generate about $66.67 in Gross Receipts
(total sales), not $10, before you start seeing steady checks from your music.”
AWAL, The Ins & Outs of Signing a Record Deal, AWAL BLOG (May 7, 2019),
https://www.awal.com/blog/signing-a-record-deal-decoded.
53
Chisolm, supra note 11, at 312; Sisario and Coscarelli, supra note 7.
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before receiving any cash flow beyond the advance from the
record label.
54
Since an artist may not actually receive royalty
checks from the record label, most of their disposable
income is generated from touring, publishing, and
merchandise sales.
55
Three-sixty deals,” in which the
record label gets a portion of the recording artist’s income
from all sources whether the record label participated in the
generation of revenue or not, have become increasingly
popular.
56
Because these kinds of contracts are relatively
new, the industry has not yet standardized how much the
record label makes off the deals, but the majority fall
between 15–35%.
57
These kinds of deals demonstrate how
much bargaining power major record labels have has
increased recently.
3. Master Recording Rights
Very few artists own their master recording rights.
58
Even highly successful artists that have been in the industry
for decades have a difficult time regaining them.
59
Major
record labels “claim outright ownership of the master
recordings made under a recording contract” either by
expressly writing in the contract that the artist assigns all of
its copyright interests to the record label in perpetuity or by
classifying the sound recordings as “works-for-hire.”
60
C. The 1976 Copyright Act Provides
For A Termination Of Rights
Remedy But Excepts Recording
Artists
54
See Chisolm, supra note 11; Sisario and Coscarelli, supra note 7.
55
Huffman, supra note 25, at 552.
56
Chisolm, supra note 11, at 314.
57
Id. at 314–15.
58
Id. at 311.
59
Id. at 328.
60
Id. at 311.
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Music copyrights are, in theory, initially vested in
the work’s author.
61
However, copyrights, like any property,
are transferable.
62
As explained supra, most record labels
require artists to grant them the copyrights to their music as
a risk premium for investing in them.
63
section 203 of the
1976 Copyright Act provides that “the exclusive or
nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of
any right under a copyright . . . otherwise than by will, is
subject to termination.”
64
This effectively reverts all
copyright interests granted from the recording artist to the
record label back to the author.
65
In order to effectuate
Section 203 termination rights, a living recording artist must
give written notice to the record label they are seeking
reversion from within thirty-five to forty years from the
execution of the copyright to one other than the recording
artist or publication of the work.
66
Recordings artists
possess this termination right regardless of the express terms
in the contractual agreement with the record label.
67
However, section 201 of the 1976 Copyright Act
provides a “work for hire” exception to this rule.
68
A work
for hire is:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially
ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work,
as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree
61
17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
62
Chisolm, supra note 11, at 285.
63
See Vulaj, supra note 3; Sisario and Coscarelli, supra note 7.
64
17 U.S.C. § 203(a).
65
17 U.S.C. § 203(b).
66
17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3)–(4).
67
17 U.S.C. § 201.
68
17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
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in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire.
69
An employer or other person for whom the work
was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this
title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise
in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights
comprised in the copyright.”
70
Most major record labels
classify albums as “works for hire” in the contract so that the
recording artists are considered employees, in which case
Section 203 does not apply and the record label is considered
the outright owner of the master recording copyrights.
71
However, just because record labels call recording
artists employees in their contracts does not make it so.
72
In
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, the Supreme
Court held that agency and labor law determine the
employment status of recording artists.
73
If a recording artist
qualifies as an employee under the Reid standard, the artist
is not entitled to Section 203 termination protection;
however, if the recording artist is considered an independent
contractor under the Reid standard, they are entitled to
69
17 U.S.C. § 101.
70
17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
71
Bolaños, supra note 19, at 406.
72
Abdullahi Abdullahi, Termination Rights in Music: A Practical Framework
for Resolving Ownership Conflicts in Sound Recordings, 2012 UNIV. ILL. J.L.
TECH & POLY 457, 369 (2012).
73
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1989).
The Act nowhere defines the terms “employee” or
“scope of employment.” It is, however, well established
that “[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated
settled meaning under ... the common law, a court must
infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress
means to incorporate the established meaning of these
terms.” In the past, when Congress has used the term
“employee” without defining it, we have concluded that
Congress intended to describe the conventional master-
servant relationship as understood by common-law
agency doctrine.
Id. (citations omitted).
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protection.
74
Thus, under the 1976 Copyright Act, the artists
that really need protection are not the ones that have “works
for hire” written in their contracts but rather the ones that are
considered employees under the common law. Because
most recording artists are not aware of the consequences of
their employment status when they first sign on, all masters
recording litigation is retrospective.
75
More specifically, the
recording artist learns later that they will never be entitled to
the ownership rights of their master recordings, so they file
a Section 203 copyright infringement suit they cannot win
because it is too late to change their employment status to be
unaffected by Section 201.
An additional wrinkle with Sections 201 and 203 is
that even if recording artists have met all of the requirements
for a Section 203 termination, the record labels are rejecting
the notice of termination on the grounds that it is not the
recording artists who are allowed to exercise the reversions
but their “loan out” companies.
76
There are currently two
74
Id. at 751.
In determining whether a hired party is an employee
under the general common law of agency, we consider
the hiring party's right to control the manner and means
by which the product is accomplished.
Among the other
factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the
source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of
the work; the duration of the relationship between
the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of
the hired party's discretion over when and how long to
work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in
hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of
the regular business of the hiring party; whether the
hiring party is in business; the provision of employee
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. No one
of these factors is determinative.
Id. at 751–52 (citations omitted).
75
See generally Vulaj, supra note 3.
76
Evynne Grover, Copyright Act 203 Termination of Transfers and Licenses:
Could More Blockbusters Get Busted?, COMM. LAW. 23, 28 (2020).
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class actions pending that challenge this contention.
77
Both
Waite v. UMG Recordings, Inc. and Johansen v. Sony Music
Entertainment, Inc. were filed in the Southern District of
New York in 2019 and 2020, respectively.
78
However it
could take years for this litigation to resolve.
D. Unconscionability Is Not A Practical
Contract Defense
The traditional contract defense of
unconscionability is also a theoretical judicial remedy
available to recording artists. In order to succeed in an
unconscionability defense, a party must establish substantive
unconscionability and procedural unconscionability.
79
That
is, the party must show that there was unfairness in the both
the bargaining procedure and in the contract terms.
80
Despite this defense, “no American court has held a
standardized music contract unconscionable.”
81
This is
largely because most major record labels settle with the
recording artist prior to trial.
82
It is also because courts
generally do not find contracts unconscionable. However,
even if this was an effective remedy, it is only available after
the fact; it does not prevent the injustice in the first place.
It is reasonable for the record label to demand a
license of the recording artists’ master recording rights
because the recording label is incurring almost all of the risk
77
Murray Stassen, Class Action Lawsuits Filed in New York Against Sony and
Universal, MUSIC BUSINESS WORLDWIDE (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/class-action-suits-filed-in-new-
york-against-sony-and-universal/.
78
Waite v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 3d 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(filed June 5, 2019); Johansen v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., No. 19-cv-
01094 (ER) 2020 WL 1529442 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 26, 2020).
79
Phillip W. Hall Jr., Smells Like Slavery: Unconscionability in Recording
Industry Contracts, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 189, 194 (2002) (citing
Brian A. Blum, Contracts: Examples and Explanations § 13.11.2, 366 (2d ed.,
Aspen Law & Business 2001).
80
Hall, supra note 80, at 194.
81
Anorga, supra note 10, at 740.
82
Id.
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of investing in an artist.
83
However, it is not reasonable for
the record label to maintain this license in perpetuity.
Thirty-five years is a reasonable amount of time for the
record label to recoup their investment while still giving the
artist time to benefit from ownership of the master recording
rights.
III. Artists Can Use Collective Bargaining To
Negotiate A Termination Clause Into Their
Recording Contracts
The largest obstacle a recording artist faces when
negotiating with a major record label over their recording
contract is the uncertainty of the artist’s future success.
84
Each recording artist requires a significant amount of
investment capital from the major record label, but the
potential returns for the label are enormous.
85
The major
record labels sign more recording artists who fail than
succeed, but the income generated from successful artists is
enough to create a surplus.
86
The more recording artists that
the major record labels sign, the more probability they
signed a successful artist.
87
This strategy has given major
record labels the upper hand in contract negotiations until to
this point, but it can be weaponized against them if new
recording artists join a union.
88
For centuries, workers in the United States with
little individual power have organized into labor unions to
prevent their employers from taking advantage of them.
89
83
Vulaj, supra note 3.
84
See Sisario and Cocarelli, supra note 7.
85
Ian Youngs, Music Stars ‘Still Need Labels’, BBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2010, 2:47
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/8557734.stm.
86
See Sisario and Cocarelli, supra note 7.
87
See id.
88
Id.
89
Joshua Freeman, The History of Labor in the U.S., U.S. DEPT OF STATE (June
17, 2020, 3:00 P.M.), https://2017-2021.state.gov/briefings-foreign-press-
centers/the-history-of-labor-in-the-u-s/index.html. The first labor union in the
United States was an association of shoemakers that was founded in 1792 in
Philadelphia. Id. Labor unions expanded to include other blue-collar
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Collective bargaining refers to the [n]egotiations between
an employer and the representatives of organized employees
to determine the conditions of employment.
90
The result of
the negotiations is a formal contract called a collective-
bargaining agreement.
91
Section 157 of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA”) gives employees the right “to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing” and join trade unions.
92
Under the NLRA,
employers are required to bargain with union representatives,
but neither the union nor the employer are required to agree
to anything so long as they bargain in good faith.
93
The
NLRA also regulates how the parties may further their
bargaining objectives (e.g., strikes, lockouts, picketing).
94
A. A Collective-Bargaining Agreement Would Be
Beneficial to All Parties
Most recording artists have little individual
bargaining power over the major record labels during their
contract negotiations.
95
Additionally, many recording artists
cannot afford to hire an attorney or do not realize that they
need one to represent them during this process.
96
By
engaging in collective bargaining, recording artists will have
a knowledgeable, experienced representative of their
choosing who will advocate for their interests despite their
inability to afford one or ignorance of the necessity of such
a representative. Specifically, their representative could
advocate for a termination clause in the collective-
professions throughout the 1800s, and by 1877 unions had gained widespread
popularity throughout the U.S. Id. Enacted by Congress in 1935, the National
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) officially gave workers the right to form and
join unions to bargain collectively. 29 U.S.C.A § 157 (West).
90
Collective Bargaining, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
91
Collective-Bargaining Agreement, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019).
92
29 U.S.C. § 157.
93
29 U.S.C. § 158.
94
29 U.S.C. § 158.
95
See Vulaj, supra note 3.
96
Id.
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bargaining agreement in way that only a handful of artists
have ever been able to do by putting the recording artists
with the least amount of earning potential on the same level
as those with the most.
Collective-bargaining agreements also provide
stability and would protect both the record label and the
recording artist. Under the NLRA, employers are prohibited
from unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of the
collective-bargaining agreement, even after it expires.
97
Additionally, collective-bargaining agreements protect all
employees, including non-union members.
98
There are only
three major record labels for most of the recording artists in
the industry, and it is likely that any union that engages in
negotiations with one of them will be able to get the label to
agree to extending the terms and conditions of the collective-
bargaining agreement, specifically the termination clause, to
non-union recording artists.
99
Given the size of the market
share of the three major record labels, a collective-
bargaining agreement with a termination clause would
become the industry standard, even for recording artists who
sign to an indie label.
100
97
29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
98
In 2003, the Economic Policy Institute found that strong unions set pay
standards that non-union employers followed. Matthew Walters, How Unions
Help All Workers, ECON. POLY INST. (Aug. 26, 2003),
https://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp143/ (“a high school
graduate whose workplace is not unionized but whose industry is 25%
unionized is paid 5% more than similar workers in less unionized industries”).
See also Patrick Denice, What do unions do for non-union workers?, WORK IN
PROGRESS (Dec. 5, 2018) http://www.wipsociology.org/2018/12/05/what-do-
unions-do-for-non-union-workers/ (“If unions in the private sector were as
strong today as they were in the late 1970s, we estimate that non-union men
working full-time would earn over $3,000 more annually than they currently
do.”).
99
Taylor Swift, acting individually, was able to get Universal to agree to
distribute non-recoupable royalties to all Universal recording artists each time
Universal sells Spotify stock. Huffman, supra note 25, at 546.
100
See Chisolm, supra note 11, at 306–07 (“the recording contracts for . . .
independent producer labels closely resemble the major label recording
contracts . . . .”).
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Furthermore, a collective-bargaining agreement
would provide more favorable contract terms to recording
artists in general, not just regarding termination clauses. A
union representative could bargain over other unfair terms
recording artists are typically stuck with such as limiting the
duration of the contracts to a maximum of seven years and
ensuring recording artists are able to see more royalty
payments upfront so that they have a continuous cashflow.
101
The parties could also agree to arbitrate any labor disputes,
which would provide a cheaper, more efficient alternative to
litigation for all parties and maintain confidentiality
throughout the proceedings.
Additionally, any lobbying done by unions for
recording artists for federal and state statues regarding
employment would similarly affect non-union employees.
102
If the record label and union could not agree to a collective-
bargaining agreement that included a termination clause, the
unions could always lobby Congress to revise the Section
201 provision allowing for the works for hire exception. In
this instance, recording artists signed to independent labels
would still benefit from the federal statute.
B. Recording Artists Already Have A Union That
Could Bargain Collectively On Their Behalf
Critics argue that artists in general are difficult to
organize because of their independent dispositions and the
101
Publishing rights are not addressed in this article, but they are substantially
similar to master recording rights and could also be subject to the collective-
bargaining agreement.
102
Denice, supra note 98.
Unions have been vocal supporters of recent various
efforts to raise the minimum wage. For instance, the
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) has
spent tens of millions of dollars on the Fight for
15 movement, pressuring cities like Seattle and New
York City to adopt a $15 per hour minimum wage and
yielding pay raises for over 8 million workers.
Id.
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remote nature of their work.
103
However, contrary to
popular belief, there is already a union available to recording
artists. SAG-AFTRA has 160,000 enrolled members, a
small percentage of which are recording artists.
104
By
signing with Universal Music Group, Sony Music
Entertainment, or Warner Music Group, recording artists are
automatically eligible for membership to SAG-AFTRA.
105
SAG-AFTRA’s Music Department manages the SAG-
AFTRA Sound Recordings Code, which governs contracts
between recording artists and record labels.
106
The Music
Department negotiates these agreements with the major
record labels, signs companies to the agreements and
enforces the contracts on behalf of covered performers. This
103
Ken Green, Artists Need Unions, Too: The Role of Organized Labor in
Creative Industries, UNION TRACK (June 4, 2019),
https://www.uniontrack.com/blog/artists-unions.
Artists are naturally individualistic, explains British
artist Patrick Brill, better-known as Bob and Roberta
Smith. As such, they want to do their own thing, not
“jump on other people’s bandwagons,” Smith says. That
spirit of individualism makes it difficult to convince
them to join together as a collective . . . . Another key
obstacle is the distributed nature of the various artistic
professions. Locals by definition represent a centralized
area where the union has a physical presence. The remote
nature of work for painters, musicians, actors and other
artists makes that model of organizing difficult to apply.
Id. See also Scott Timberg, Can Unions Save the Creative Class?,
SALON (Mar. 18, 2013, 8:25 P.M.),
https://www.salon.com/2013/03/18/can_unions_save_the_creative
_class/ (“Collective bargaining requires an obedient rank-and-file,”
[Ted] Gioia says. “But is there a profession more resistant to this
than art-making? I'd rather try to put the toothpaste back in the tube
than attempt to get artists to march in lockstep.”).
104
About, SAG-AFTRA, https://www.sagaftra.org/about (last visited Jan. 15,
2021).
105
Sound Recordings, SAG-AFTRA, https://www.sagaftra.org/production-
center/contract/806/getting-started (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
106
SAG-AFTRA is Your Voice in Music Meet SAG-AFTRA’s Music
Department, SAG-AFTRA (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.sagaftra.org/sag-
aftra-your-voice-music-–-meet-sag-aftra’s-music-department [hereinafter
“Music Department”].
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includes filing claims and tracking compliance by the
companies.”
107
SAG-AFTRA’s Government Affairs and
Public Policy Department advocates on behalf of recording
artists to Congress.
108
SAG-AFTRA’s executive director David White
likened SAG-AFTRA membership to having a legal team
at [the artist’s] disposal.”
109
Presently, SAG-AFTRA
negotiated a collective-bargaining agreement with the major
record labels that requires them to pay royalty and non-
royalty artists a standard rate per hour of vocal session.
110
Payment by the record label must be made to the recording
artist within twenty-one days of the session.
111
SAG-
AFTRA’s collective-bargaining agreement also currently
requires the record labels to contribute to its health and
retirement funds if it owns the master recording rights to a
recording artist’s song.
112
If there is a dispute over an
existing contract between a record label and recording artist,
SAG-AFTRA can provide arbitration.
113
However, despite the existing and potential benefits
of SAG-AFTRA membership, there are several concerns
with SAG-AFTRA. First, most recording artists do not
realize that they are eligible for SAG-AFTRA membership,
and record labels have no incentive to inform them.
114
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Leight, supra note 14.
110
Music Department, supra note 106.
111
Id.
112
Sideletter from Michael J. Lebowich, Warner Bros. Records, et al., &
Duncan Crabtree-Ireland, SAG-AFTRA, on Agreed Interpretations of National
Code of Fair Practice for Sound Recordings Relating to Health & Retirement
Issues, (Oct. 18, 2018, 10:54 P.M.), https://www.sagaftra.org/files/2018-
2020%20Sound%20Recordings%20MOA.pdf.
113
Leight, supra note 14.
114
Id. In 2016, Lady Gaga told Carson Daly on his radio show, “We don’t have
a union as artists. We’re just fighting for ourselves.” Francesca Bacardi, Lady
Gaga Continues to Defend Kesha in Dr. Luke Battle, Says She’s Being
“Publicly Shamed”, E ONLINE (Mar. 8, 2016, 9:03 A.M.),
https://www.eonline.com/news/746788/lady-gaga-continues-to-defend-kesha-
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Without this awareness, recording artists cannot come
together on a large enough scale required to bargain for their
master recording rights. Second, unsigned artists and those
signed to independent labels are not privy to SAG-AFTRA’s
benefits.
115
Thus, even if SAG-AFTRA was able to
negotiate a termination clause granting Section 203
termination rights, a very large percentage of recording
artists would be left out of the benefit of their bargain.
116
For
these reasons, SAG-AFTRA must either expand their
representation of recording artists to all labels or recording
artists should organize an independent union open to
everyone. Once they have organized, the new union can
bargain on their behalf.
C. Collective Bargaining Has Been Effective in the
Entertainment Industry
SAG-AFTRA has been negotiating collective-
bargaining agreements since the 1930s.
117
SAG-AFTRA
has experience negotiating specifically with all three major
record labels, and it can also enforce the collective-
in-dr-luke-battle-says-she-s-being-publicly-shamed. During an interview with
rapper 2 Chainz, former rapper Joe Budden expressed his desire for a hip-hop
strike. Joe Budden, Pull Up Season 2 Episode 2 Featuring 2 Chainz, YOUTUBE
(Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qLn2IWcvpiU. In 2020,
Kanye West urged his “brother” musicians to band together to form a union to
stand up to record labels over ownership of their master recording rights. Kanye
West (@kanyewest), Twitter (Sept. 16, 2020, 8:23 A.M.),
https://twitter.com/kanyewest/status/1306207184347299840; Kanye West
(@kanyewest), Twitter (Sept. 22, 2020, 12:31 P.M.),
https://twitter.com/kanyewest/status/1308443797802508290.
115
Leight, supra note 14.
116
See Market Share of Record Companies in the United States From 2011 to
2019, by Label Ownership, STATISTA (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/317632/market-share-record-companies-
label-ownership-usa/. In 2019, independent record labels comprised about 35%
of the U.S. market share. Id.
117
The History of the Unions During the 1930s, SAG-AFTRA,
https://www.sagaftra.org/about/our-history/1930s (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
SAG negotiated its first collective-bargaining agreement in 1937 on behalf of
stunt doubles and stagehands. Id. The first national AFRA (the predecessor to
AFTRA) collective-bargaining agreement was signed in 1938 between AFRA
on behalf of radio talent and NBC and CBS. Id.
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bargaining agreements.
118
Collective-bargaining
agreements contain the rules for how labor unions and the
record labels may enforce their objectives, such as labor
strikes.
119
Strikes coordinated by labor unions are some of
the most effective ways workers can challenge unfair labor
practices by their employers.
120
A coordinated labor strike
by recording artists against major record labels would be an
effective remedy but would require a lot of organization on
a national level that only a labor union could provide. But it
has worked before.
121
In 1942, AMF musicians went on strike against the
major record companies in the United States seeking
royalties to be paid by the record companies for a union fund
supporting unemployed musicians.
122
Union musicians did
not make recordings for two years.
123
Independent record
companies were the first to settle with the unions.
124
Finally
in November 1944, all the major record companies came to
an agreement.
125
More recent strikes by other kinds of labor unions
in the music industry over collective-bargaining agreements
118
See SAG-AFTRA, Record Labels Reach Tentative Agreement, SAG-AFTRA
(Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.sagaftra.org/sag-aftra-record-labels-reach-
tentative-agreement.
119
29 U.S.C. § 158.
120
Ahmed White, Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an
Effective Right to Strike, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2018); Why Strikes
Matter, LABOR NOTES (Oct. 17, 2019), https://labornotes.org/2019/10/why-
strikes-matter.
121
Jim Dorsch, The American Federation of Musicians Recording Bans of
1942-1944 and 1948, SPINDITTY (Feb. 27, 2019),
https://spinditty.com/industry/Music-The-Recording-Bans-of-1942-1944-and-
1948.
122
Id. At the time, the AMF only represented instrumentalists. Id. Vocalists
were represented by the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists
(“AFTRA”), who later merged with the Screen Actors Guild to become SAG-
AFTRA. Id. AFTRA joined the strike shortly thereafter. Id.
123
Id. During this time, record companies continued to release music that had
been recorded prior to the strike, but this music was limited. Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
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have also proven to be effective. In 2019, the Chicago
Symphony Orchestra’s seven-week strike led to an increased
salary and pension benefits.
126
In 2007, the Local One union
was able to negotiate higher wages, daily minimum worker
quotas, and better working hours for Broadway
stagehands.
127
These union victories are evidence that labor
unions are effective in the music industry.
Other kinds of artistic unions have also successfully
employed the labor strike. In 2007, the Writers Guild of
America and Screen Actors Guild walked out over
Hollywood producers refusing to grant union jurisdiction
over writing for new media such as Internet series and
residual payments for downloaded television shows and
movies.
128
Production companies ran reruns and old movies
to supplement their empty broadcast and cable network
airtime.
129
However, the unions prevailed because they
were well-organized, well-funded, had a lot of publicity, and
treated “scabs” harshly.
130
In 2014, the National Writers
126
Howard Reich, 7-Week CSO Strike Over as Musicians, Board Ratify New
Contract, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 27, 2019),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/music/howard-reich/ct-ent-
cso-strike-settlement-0428-story.html.
127
Campbell Robertson, Stagehands End Walkout on Broadway, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 29, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/29/theater/29broadway.html.
128
Michael Cieply, David Carr & Brooks Barnes, Screenwriters on Strike Over
Stake in New Media, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/06/business/media/06strike.html.
129
Id.
130
Timberg, supra note 103.
The 07-’08 campaign was also better run than most.
Support by high-profile stars Steve Carell calling in
sick to "The Office" helped, as did enlisting the
showrunners who head a television program and often
come out of the writers’ ranks. “These were people who
made a lot of money for the studios, and who were used
to working at the highest levels of the networks and
studios,” says [Howard] Rodman . . . . During a period
that cut into many writers’ savings, the union offered
loans to some, which kept screenwriters’ homes from
being taken or their medical coverage from being
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Union successfully collected unpaid fees from Heart & Soul
Magazine on behalf of twelve of its members.
131
Despite the
individuality of the writing industry (much like recording
artists), authors have a strong union presence that effectuates
polices and negotiates with publishing companies on their
behalf.
132
Once a collective-bargaining agreement has been
negotiated, SAG-AFTRA can guarantee its enforcement
through a large-scale recording artist strike. This would
require much organization and solidarity, lots of funding,
and swift retaliation against “scabs,” but it could be
successful in the recording artist-record label context as
previous entertainment-related union strikes have proven to
be.
D. Current Music Coalition Efforts Are Not
Effective
Presently, there are several non-union coalitions
that advocate for recording artists’ rights.
133
The Artist
Rights Alliance specifically advocates for the ownership of
master recording rights by recording artists.
134
The Music
Artists Coalition, formed in 2019,
135
“lobbies on national
cancelled . . . . Part of the reason Hollywood strikes can
work is that the unions protect their position: Anyone
who symbolically crossed the picket line can never be a
member.
Id.
131
Green, supra note 103.
132
Id.
133
These coalitions were formed to counter the RIAA, which lobbies on behalf
of over 85% of record labels in the U.S., including Sony Music Group,
Universal Music Group, and Warner Music Group. About RIAA, RIAA,
https://www.riaa.com/about-riaa/riaa-members/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
134
Artists’ Bill of Rights, ARTIST RTS. ALL.,
https://artistrightsalliance.org/about_us (last visited Jan. 15, 2021) (“The Right
to Control Our Work – the ability to decide when and on what terms our creative
works are performed, reproduced, or distributed, and the ability to assign these
rights to partners of our choosing.”).
135
Artists, Songwriters and Executives Form Music Industry Coalition, MUSIC
CONNECTION (Jul. 30, 2019), https://www.musicconnection.com/artists-
songwriters-executives-form-coalition/.
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and state levels regarding issues that impact creators” in the
digital age.
136
The Recording Academy also “amplifies
music’s collective voice on Capitol Hill and empowers
creators” by “fighting for creators’ rights.”
137
However, these coalitions are opposed by the RIAA,
the well-funded organization behind passing the Section 201
“works for hire” exception in the first place.
138
Though
music coalitions advocating for recording artists eventually
prevailed and convinced the RIAA to petition Congress to
remove the harmful language from the Copyright Act, there
is still residual animosity between recording artist advocates
and the RIAA that make it difficult for them to negotiate.
139
A labor union with no history with the RIAA might be easier
to negotiate with and would better understand the artists’
interests from the collective bargaining negotiations that
need to be lobbied in Congress.
IV. Conclusion
Both the record labels and recording artists have
compelling reasons for owning the master recording rights,
and Section 203 provides a solution that balances these
competing interests through the termination of transfers and
licenses granted by the recording artist to the record label
after thirty-five years. Unfortunately, the parties are not of
equal bargaining power, so up until now recording artists
have not been able to negotiate such a term into their contract.
136
Mission, MUSIC ARTISTS COAL.,
https://www.musicartistscoalition.com/#!/who-we-are (last visited Jan. 15,
2021).
137
Helping Music and its Makers Thrive, RECORDING ACAD.,
https://www.grammy.com/recording-academy#advocacy (last visited Jan. 15,
2021).
138
Eric Boehlert, Four Little Words, SALON (Aug. 28, 2000, 11:30 P.M.),
https://www.salon.com/2000/08/28/work_for_hire/. On November 29, 2000,
Congress passed a bill that amended the then existing Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
101(e). Id. By quietly lobbying to insert “as a sound recording,” to the
definition of “work made for hire,” the RIAA ensured record labels were the
sole legal owners of the master recordings rights for their legally copyrightable
life—ninety-five years. Id.
139
Id.
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However, there is strength in numbers, and by organizing
into a new or existing union, recording artists can utilize the
knowledge and experience of union legal representatives and
put pressure on record labels via strikes to create a collective
bargaining agreement that vests ownership of the master
recording rights in recording artists, the true owners of the
works. Sadly, existing contracts would likely not be affected
by this collective bargaining agreement. However, it would
benefit future recording artists and future agreements for
existing recording artists; and hopefully the next Kanye
West will own their masters.
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